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BEK1'RAND EQUILIBKIUM IN A D[FFERENTIATED DUOPOLY~`
BY HELMUT BESTERt
This paper studies the stability o( price competition in a horizontally
ditierentiated duopoly. The firms' demand is derived from a distribution o(
consumer preferences. This description of the consumer sector is applicable to
a large class of diH'erentiated commodity markets, including spatial competi-
tion models. We show that there is a(pure) price setting equilibrium when
cunsumer tastes are sutficiently dispersed. Further conditions on the dis-
persedness of prefercnces guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium. In addi-
tion, we examine the relation between consumer preferencos and the compet-
itiveness and efficiency of the equilibrium outcome.
I . INTRODUCTION
This papcr investigates the stability of price competition in a horizontally
diQerentiated duopoly. The duopolists' demand is derived from a distribution of
preference characteristics over the population of consumers. We show that
competition between the firms results in a(pure) price equilibrium when consumer
tastes are sufficiently dispersed. The competitiveness of [he equilibrium is closely
related to the diversity of consumer types. When the support of the preference
distribution shrinks to a single point, the equilibrium approaches the Bertrand
outcome uf a homogeneous good market. We further show that a sufficient degree
of preference dispersion guarantees uniqueness of the equilibrium. Finally, we
discuss the firms' incentives for pruduct difierentiation from the viewpoint of social
efficiency.
The attractiveness of Bertrand's (1883) approach to the theory of oligopoly lies
in the fact that in his model prices are chosen by economic agents rather than by a
fictitiuus auctiuneer. Yet, modelling price competition leads to a number of
problems, especially with homogeneous goods. As already Bertrand (1883) ob-
served, in the case of equally efficient firms and constant marginal costs the price
setting equilibrium coincides with the competitive outcome. This extreme predic-
tiun, that holJs even with only two firms, appears paradoxical and economically
unintcresting fur oligopulistic competition. In the absence of the constant returns to
scale assumptiun, the Bertrand model faces up to a further drawback, narnely the
problem uf nunexistence of equilibrium. This problem was first pointed out by
Edgeworth (1925) in his analysis of u capacity constrained oligopoly. ln his famous
article on the stability of competition, Hotelling (1929) took the view that these
probl~ms uriginate in the abstractiun of humogeneous goods. Under this assump-
' Manuscript receiveJ luly I~;XI; final versiun received Augusl IY91.
~ Suppurt by tha f~utsche Furschungsgemeinschaft under the Heisenberg Programme and SFB 303 is
gratcfully acknuwledged. The author wishes to thank Werner Hildenbrand, Barry Nalcbuff, André de
Palmu, anJ two anunymous referees for stimulating discussions and helpful suggestiuns.
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tion each single firm can attract the whole market by only slightly undercutting the
prices of its rivals. Holelling argucd that this "Ieads to a type of instability which
disappears when the quantity sold by each (seller) is considered as a contínuous
function of the difïerences in price" (Hotelling 1929, p. 44). Unfortunately,
however, restoring continuity of demand by inlroducing product helerogeneity is
not sufficient to guarantee the existence of equilibrium. As was shown by
D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), Hotelling's (1929) own modcl of a
spatially difíerentiated duopoly may fail to possess an equilibrium under certain
parameter constellations.
In accordance with Hotelling's (t929) idca, consumer prefcrences in our model
generate each firm's demand as a continuous function of the difference between its
own and its rival's price. Through addilional assumptions on the distribution of
consumer characteristics we ensure that each firm's profit is a quasiconcave
function of its price, which guarantees existence of equilibria in pure pricing
strategies. Indeed, in price setting games pure strategies are more appealing than
mixed strategies if one takes the view that pricing decisions are not irreversible.
The reason is that the mixed strategy equilibrium creates some incentives for ex
post deviation. In a mixed strategy equilibrium at least some seller can gain by
changing his price after learning the realization of the other sellers' prices.z
Interestingly, our framework contains Hotelling's (1929) model as a special case.
This allows us to obtain a straightforward insight into the problem of nonexistence
of pure price equilibrium. In fact, similar problems arise in a variety of price
competition models. In the setting of the present paper the causes of such problems
are easily understood and, at least in some cases, it becomes clear which
assumptions are required to overcome lhem.
Following Sattinger (1984) and Perloff and Salop (1985), we assume that there is
a continuum of consumers each of whom buys only one of the two brands. Tastes
vary within the popula[ion and so this approach differs from the represenlative
consumer models of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976).~ In contrast with
Sat[inger (1984) and Perloff and Salop (1985), however, we do not require that the
consumers' valuations for the two brands are drawn independently from some
probability distribution. In our model, the pattern of tastes within the population
may vary in a systematic way and demand need not be symmetric.' As a result, our
description of preferences is applicable to a large class of horizontally differentiated
Z Dasgupta and Maskin 119g6) show that their cxistence theorems apply to price competition in
Hotelling's ( 1929) model. A more detailed analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium o( this model can be
found in Osborne and Pitchik ( 19gl3). For the existence of equilibria with discriminatory pricing strategies,
see Lederer and Hurter ( 1986). Novshek ( 19go) studics an altcrnative equilibrium concept that drops thc
assumption of Nesh behavior. A bargaining approach to spatial competition is dcvclopcd in Bcster 119i39).
~ On the relation between the probability model of consumer preferences and the representative
consumer model, sce Sattinger (1984), Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse f19tS7), and Deneckere and
Rothschild ( 1986).
~ The symmetry of demand in Sattinger ( 19841 and Perlofi and Salop (1985) allows these authors to
focus on single-price equilibria; compare our Proposition 4. Sattinger 119g41 and Perlofi and Salop (1985)
check the second ordcr conditions for profit maximization at the prospectivic equilibrium point, but do not
provic existcnce of a symmetric equilibrium.
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markets including models of spatial competition, in which demand typically fails to
be symmetric.
The importance of the distribution of consumer characteristics in models of
product differentiation has been recognized in a number of papers that are related
to our approach. While we focus on horizontal ditïerentiation, Gabszewicz,
Shaked, Sutton, and Thisse (1981) establish conditions on the distribution of
consumer incomes that guarantee existence of equilibrium in a model of vertical
difTerentiation. In theír model the income distribution determines the shape of the
firms' profit functions because richer consumers are willing to pay more for a given
improvement in quality. De Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou, and Thisse (1985)
investigate price competition in the logit model of horizontal product ditïerentia-
tion; the basic idea of their approach is to find the appropriate parameter
restrictions for a given family of parameterized distribution functions. Champsaur
and Rochet (1988) investigate the equilibrium in a model of one-dimensional
consumer and product characteristics. Caplin and Nalebufï (1989) do not impose
dimensionality restrictions but assume that utility functions are linear with respect
to consumer characteristics; in spatial competition models this restricts the
applicability of their results essentially to the case of quadratic transportation cost
functions. Moreover, their assumptions on the distribution of consumer character-
istics are not very appealing in the spatial context because they require the
population density over space [o be unimodal. The advantage of our approach is
that it neither requires a particular functional form of utility or distribution
functions nor dimensionality restrictions on product and consumer characteristics.
Like most of the literature, we confine ourselves to the case where consumers
purchase a single unit of one of the difTerentiated commodities. Some advances
toward divisible commodities are made in Caplin and Nalebuff (1989) and Dierker
(1988).
Section 2 of the paper describes the basic model. Section 3 contains the main
existence theorem and a discussion of the relationship between product substitut-
ability and price competition. Section 4 provides conditions for the uniqueness of
equilibrium. The efi'iciency properties of the market outcome are studied in Section
5. In Section 6 we compule the equilibrium of an example. Finally, Section 7 shows
this example is homeomorphic to Hotelling's (1929) model with quadratic trans-
portation costs. Also, this section provides a simple insight why some models in the
literature fail to possess a price setting equilibrium in pure stratcgies.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a market with two firms, indexed i- I, 2, and a continuum of
consumers. Each firm i produces a distinct brand of some commodity at a constant
marginal cost c; .' The duopolists compete by setting prices and p; is the price
charged by firm i. We assume that each consumer needs and buys one unit of either
s With constant marginal costs c, , firm i has no incentive to ration consumers as tung asp; z r, . 7ltis
allows us tu cunfine ourselves to prices as the firms' strategic variables. In the case of increasing marginal
cosh, h might be optimal for a firm to restrict iu supply and w strategic interactions would become more
cumplcx.
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the first or the second brand. Effectivcly Ihis means that the consumers' rescrvation
valualions for the two goods and their incomes are taken to be high enough so thal
thc option of not purchasing a good at all is not rclcvant within Ihc rangc of possiblc
equilibrium prices. Indeed, we will show that competition results in eyuilibrium
prices that lie below some upper bound z defined in equation t6) below. Our
simplification rules out [hal the dislribution of incomes plays a role in Ihe
determination of demand. In our model competitíon influences each firm's market
share but does not afiect the total number of sales in the market.
Each consumer is characterized by a preference parameter 8 E lR that is
distributed across the population according to the cumulative distribution function
F(.). As we demonstrate below, the parameter 9 may be regarded as being derived
from some vector of product and preference characteristics. We use the parameter
B as a measure of the intensity by which the consumer prefers the brand supplied
by firm 2 to the brand of firm I. More specifically, consumer t3 is willing to spend
at most 9 more units of íncome in order to purchase brand 2 rather than brand I. If
B c 0, the consumer actually prefers the first brand and so he will buy good 2 only
if it is cheaper than good 1 by an amount of at least ~8~. Clearly, a consumer with
characteristic 6- 0 regards the two brands as perfect substitutes and so he goes to
the firm with the lowest price. In summary, consumer 6 will buy the good from firm
I only if
(I) e~n,-n,.
We now show that our approach applies to models of purely spatial competition
where the two brands are represented by the firms' locations in some geographical
space: Let the market area be described by some metric space tM, d}, where
d(x, y) denotes the distance between locations x and y. The characteristics vector
of product i is then simply given by the location z; E M of firm i. Likewise, each
consumer's characteristics are described by his initial location a E M. To purchase
good i consumer a has to pay a transportation cost t(d(x;, a)), where t(~) denotes
transportation costs as a function of distance d. Consumer a visits firm I only if
p~ t t(d(xt, a)) ~ p2 f t(d(xZ, a)). This is consistent with (I) if we define
(2) B~ ~ t(d(zt, a)) - t(d(x2, a)).
Using (2) we can derive the distribution function F(.) from the distribution of the
consumers' initial locations in M. In the location model, therefore, the function F(.)
summarizes the consumers' distribution over space, their transportation cost as a
function ofdistances, and the firms' locations. ~ As an example, in Section 6 we will
compute F(~) for Hotelling's (1929) model and demonstrate that our existence result
applies if the transportation cost function t(.) lies in some neighborhood of the
quadratic function t(d) - d2.
More generally, following Lancaster (t966) and Mas-Colell (1975), each of the
two commodities may be represented by a point x; in some space of commodity
characteristics X;. A good is then described as a bundle of characteristics such as
" The significance of the customer distrilwtion for the existence of equilibrium in HoteUing's (1929)
location model is discussed in Shilony 119811.
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quality, location, colour, time, and so on. Consumer preferences are defined over
the producl characteristics vector x and a numeraire commodity m called "mon-
ey." Preferences vary across consumers and depend on some vector of consumer
characteristics u E A. The utility of consumer a is represented by the utility
function U(u, x, m). Accordingly consumer a buys good 1 if U(u, xl , m- p t)?
U(a, xz, m - pz). To ensure that his decision can be represented by (1) we assume
that utilities are quasi-linear in money, i.e. that U(u, x), m) - U(a, x2, m')
implies U(u, xl, m t p) - U(u, x2, m' t A) for all A E IR. !t then follows that
consumer u buys good I only if B„ ~ nz - nl where B„ is defined as the solution
of
(3) U(a, xi, m t B„) - U(u, xz, m).
Note that F(.) depends both upon the product characteristics (xl, x2) and the
distribution of consumer characteristics a. This contrasts with the approach of
Caplin and Nalebuff (1989) where distributional assumptions are made only with
regard to a. While we presume knowledge about (zt, x2), Caplin and Nalebuff do
not utilize such information.
The consumers' decision rule (I) together with the distribution of preferences
determines the market shares of firm I and 2 as F( P2 - p I) and I - F( Pz - p I),
respeclively. For each pair of pricing strategies the profits of firm I and firm 2 are
given as
(4) 11i(ni,Pz)-[Pi -ci)F(Pz-Pi),
flz(Pi, Pz)-~Pz -~'z~[1 -F(Pz -Pt)~-
In what follows, we will assume that the distribution of consumer preferences
satisfies the following condition.
AssuMtrrtoN I. There is a Q G 0 and a B~ 0 such that F(g) - 0 and F(9) -
I. Moreover, F(-) is continunus and ttvice cnntinunusly differentiuble nn (~, B) with
F'(B) 7 0 for all ~ G 9 G B.
Thus the support of F(~) is the compact interval [Q, B]. The firms' profits are
continuous functions of their pricing strategies because Assumption 1 precludes
atoms in the distribution of B. As O G 0 G B, tastes vary in the population and so our
analysis is concerned with horizontal, rather than vertical (quality), product
ditTerentiation. Indeed, Assumption I implies 0 G F(0) G 1 so that the market
share of either firm is positive when both firms quote the same price.
For some part of our analysis the shape of the cumulative distribution function
F(.) will be of great importance. As a measure of its concavity we will employ the
parameter'
(5) P(B) - -F'(B)!F'(B),
~ In utility theory this parameter is known as the measure of absolute risk aversion, see Pratt (1964).
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which is well defincd for all Q c 9 ~ 9. The parameter p(B) dcscrihes the (negalive)
rate of change of the density at point B. The steeper the density function at ll, the
higher is Ihc absolute value of l,(BI.
A market {F(-), ci, cz} is callcd syrnnrc~lric if F(0) - Il2 and ct - c,. In a
symmetric market, equal prices for the two brands result in an equal division of the
market and equal profits for the duopolists. The condition F(0) - Il2 is satisfied for
instance if the consumers' valuations for each of the two goods are independently
drawn from the same probability distribution as in Sattinger ( 1984) and Perlo(T and
Salop ( 1986)." It is easy to see that it also holds in location models where consumers
are located uniformly on a circle as in Salop ( 1979). But these markets are special
cases and in general the symmetry assumption rppears rather strong. For instance,
it is easily verified that Hotelling's (1929) location model constitutes a symmetric
market only when the duopolists locate their stores at the same distance from the
endpoints of the market.`'
3. PRICE COMPETITION
In this section we analyse price competition under the assumption that the
duopolists behave as Nash competitors. A price pair ( p i. Pz) ~(c' i, c'z ) is called
an eyuilibriam of the market {F(.), c I, cz } if II i( p~, p ,)? Il t( p i, p 2) and
nz(Pi. Pi) ~ Rz(Pi. Pz) forall pi andpz. The restrictíon (pi. Pz) ~( c'). c'z)
removes weakly dominated pricing strategies from the analysis. In this way we
eliminate equilibria in which one of the duopolists charges a price p; ~ c; and
receives zero profits because the competitor's price ofler attràcts the demand of all
consumers.
The main resull of this section deals with the existence of equilibrium. To state
the result, we define the parameter
é-Q é-Q 1
F(0) } cz' I- F(0)
t cl J.
The proof of the following Proposition reveals that it is always optimal for a firm to
quote some price below z as long as the other firm charges a price below z. This fact
allows us to compactify the firms' strategy sets. In order to apply a standard fixed
point argument, it remains to specify conditions on F(-) that ensure convex-
valuedness of the firms' reaction correspondences.
PROPOSITION I. Lel - 2l( z - c I) ~ p( 9 ) s 2l( z- cz) jor al! Q ~ t3 ~ B. Then
lhe markel {F(.), ct, cz} has an equilibrium ( p i. Pi)-
PROOr. By Assumption 1, Il;( p ~, pz ) is continuous in ( p I, pz ). We will show
that Il; ( p i, p z) is quasi-concave in p; as long as c; ~ p; ~ z. Note that I I t( p I,
Pz )- 0 if pz - p i ~ g and that fl i( p I, Pz ) is strictly increasing in p i if pz -
~ The basic argument Ihat shows that the preference strvcture in these models catisfies our symmetry
dcfinition can be found in footnote 17 of Perlofi and Salop I IytSS).
9 Compare Section 6 below.
BGRTRAND EQUILIBRIUM 439
p I? B. Therefore, Il I( p I, p z) is quasi-concave in p i if it is concave in p I for Q
G pz - pI G 8. Note that I7i(pi, pz) is twice continuously ditíerentiable when
~ G Pz - pl G 6. Upon differentiation one obtains
(~) dz[1i(Oi, Pz)Idp~ - -2F'(Pz -Pi) t ~Pt - c~~F„(Pz -Pi).
Therefore, p t? c l and F"(pz - p t)IF'(Pz - p t) s 2l( z- c l) imply
(8) dzni(Pi, Pz)Idpi ~ 2F'(Pz -Pi)~P~ - z)IIz - cl~.
By(8)dzIIl(pt,Pz)Idpj sOforpl szandsolll(pt,Pz)isaconcavefunction
of p t as long as ~ G p z - p I G B. This proves quasi-concavity of [I I(p I, pz ); an
analogous argument establishes that Ilz( p I, Pz) is quasi-concave in pz for cz s pz
~ z. As Ili(pt, Pz) and IIz(pI, Pz) satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2 in
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), there is a(p i, pZ) with c; s p` s z such that
nl(P i~ Pi) ~ nl(PI. Pz) for all cl s pl ~ z and IIz(P i~ Pi) ~ n2(Pi. Pz)
for all cz ~ pz s z.
It thus remains to show that there is no p; 1 z such that II t(p I, p Z)~[I I( p j,
p z) or [I z( pi, pz)~ I] z( pj, p2). Suppose there is a p t~ z such that fl I( p I, p Z)
~ nI(Pi. Pi). If Pi s z t ~, [hen III(PI ~ Pi) - 0 for all pt 7 z, which
contradicts Il I(p t, p Z)~[I t( p~, p Z). If z t B G p Z, then by offering some price
p I ~ z? p 2 firm 1 get the payoá [ p I - c I]F(p2 - p I) ~ [ p t - c t]F(0) because
F(0) ? F(p 2 - p I.) Also one must have p I s p Z - Q because F( p Z- p I)-
0 for all p t ~ p 2- g. As a result, by offering p I 7 z firm 1 gets a payoff II I ( p I,
pi) ~[ p Z- ~- c~]F(0). By setting p~ - p Z- 6 firm 1 could get p Z- 9-
cl because then F( p Z - p'i )- F(9) - 1. As a result, setting
PI ~ z~ Pi certainly implies [II(pl, Pi) ~ nt(P'~. P2) ifpZ - 6- ct 1[Pz
- ~ - c I ]F(0), i.e., if
(9)
B-~
P i~ 1- F(0)
f g f c i.
But as p Z ~ z t~ implies (9), one must have II I(p I, pZ) ~ II I(p2- B, p 2) ~
[I I ( p i, p z) for all p I ~ z, a contradiction. This proves [I I(p~, p z) ? I7 I( p I,
p;) for all p I. As symmetric argument proves that also IIz(p j, p 2) ? Ilz(p j, pz)
for all Pz. Q.E.D.
Note that - 2l( z- ct) G 0 G 2l( z- cz ). Therefore, the existence result holds
in particular when B is uniformly distributed over [g, 9j, because then p(B) - 0
everywhere. In general, Proposition I requires F(.) to be neither extremely concave
nor extremely convex at any point ~ G 6 G 6. In other words, the distribution of the
preference characteristic must be sufficiently dispersed as to preclude points at
which the density function becomes rather steep. As a consequence of this
requirement, the impact of small price changes upon the firms' market shares
cannot become very large. In the special case of symmetric markets the condition
for existence takes the rather simplc form - II(9 - ~) s p(9) ~ II(B -~). Thus the
larger the support of F(~), the more demanding becomes the restriction on p(B). The
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inequalitics arc almost automatically satisficd whcn all conwmcrs rccard thc two
brands as close substitutes and B- Q is cluse tu zeru.
The duopolists enjuy a quasi-munopolistic positiun as long as the custumen of
each firm regard thc brand of thc othcr firm as a pour substitutc. l`hc intensily uf
compctition between thc two firms should hc positively rclated tu the suhstilutabil-
ity of Ihcir products. In ordcr to study thc relatiunship hctwccn product ditTcrcn-
tiation and cumpctition, wc now cxaminc a spccific changc in the dislrihutiun uf
preferences. Following PerlofT and Salop (1985) we multiply each consumer's
characleristic B by sume factur a~ 0. Thus a~ I re~ults in mure inlensc
preferences whereas a factor a c I makes the Iwo brands closcr suhstitutes. In thc
contexl of spatial competition modcls this change of preferences occurs if the
original transportation cost I(.) is multiplied by a. Scaling up or duwn preferences
in this way amounts to replacing the dislribution function F(-) by the distrihution
function Fo(-), where
(10) F„(A) - F(Bla).
The following Proposition generalizes a result that was derived by Perlo(ïand Salop
(1985) for the case of symmetric markets.
PHO~oslnoN 2. Lel ( ni. p;) br' ua eqrrilibrium nrlhr markc~l {F(.). c i. c, } cmd
!cl c i- cz . Then 1he mur! e~l {F~(-), c i, c, } hcr.~ un eqnilibrinm ( ji ~, p, ) suc-h Ihur
n t- an i f( I - a)c ~ nrrd p, - ap', f ( I - a)c, .
PKOOr. By definition of equilibrium we have
(II) [ni -c~ilF(n' -ni)?[ni -c~i]F(n` -ni).
for all p'~ ? c t. Using (1 I), c ~- cZ , and the expressions for ( p ~, p, ) we obtain
(12) ~Pi -ci)FQ(P~ -Pi)-aLni -ci)F(nz -ni)
~ a~ní - c'i~F(n' -ní) - a[ní - c~i]Fo(Pz - c, f acz - aní).
If (12) holds for all p't ? c t, then it also holds for all n't defined by p i
(1 - a)c t where n i~ c t. As c i - c2 , substituting p i for p'i yields
(13) ~Pi -c~i~Fa(n~ -n~) ~~ni -c'i~Fo(Pz -ni),
- ap'i f
for all p t? c i. Thus p i satisfies the profit-maximizing condition for firm I. An
analogous argument for firm 2 completes the proof. Q.E.D.
An increase in the factor a raises p; . As p~ - p t- a( p Z - pi) implies Fa( p~
- p t)- F( p Z - p i), the firms' market shares remain unafTected. Consequently,
in the equilibrium ( p t, pZ ) of the market {Fa(.), c i, cz} the producers' profits are
a(] i( p i, p;) and aI],( p ~, p;), respectively. An increase in preference intensity
raises the profits of both firms. Of course, when the products become perfect
substitutes equilibrium profits approach zero in the limit as a-~ 0.
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4. UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM
Having established conditions for the existence of equilibrium, we now turn to
the question of whether the equilibrium is unique.
PROPOSITtoN 3. Let g G cZ - cl G 6 and 3l[~ -(c2 - cl)] s p(B) ~ 3l[9 -
(cZ - c I)] for all ~ G g G B. Then if there exists an equilibrium ( p i, p 2), it is
unique.
PROOF: First it will be shown that Q G p 2 - p~ G 9 in any equilibrium ( p~,
pZ). Clearly, ~ ~ pZ- p~ s 9 in any equilibrium. Thus it remains to show that
B~ Pi- ni ~ 9. Suppose the contrary, for example p Z - p~ - Q. Then F( p2
-pi)-F(Q) -OandIIt(pi,pi) -O.ButCII(pj,P2)-0implies pi -ct.
Indeed if p i) ct, then F(p Z - p I)~ 0 for any c t G p t G p~ so that Il t(p t,
pz) 7 0- II t( pi, p2), which is inconsistent with the definition of equilibrium.
Thus pi - cl and p 2- p i t g. But then p Z z cZ implies cz - ct ~ 8, a
contradiction to the conditions of the Proposition. This proves p2- p~~ g. An
analogous argument shows pZ- p~ G~.
As Q G p 2- p~ G 9, 0 G F( pi - p~) G 1. Therefore for a su8~iciently small
e~ 0, also F( p Z- p~- e) ~ 0. Because p i f e J p~ z c t implies 0 G II I(p ~
t e, pZ) s[I I( p~ , p 2), it must be the case that p~ 1 c I. Similarly, p Z 1 c2 .
This together with 0 G F( p 2- p~) G 1 implies that ( p~, p2) must satisfy the first
order conditions for profit-maximization:
(14) dll~(Pi. Pz)~dPi - F(Pz -PI) - LPi - cl]F~(Pz -Pi) - 0
dllz(Pi, Pz)Idpz - [1 - F(Pz ' Pi)] - [Pz - cz]F~(Pz -Pi) - a.
Define B' - pZ- p j and
(15) ~(B) ~ 2F(B) t [B - (cz - ct)]F'(8) - 1.
Then by subtracting the two equations in (14) we find that if (pi, p 2) is a solution
to the first-order conditions, B' must satisfy ~(9") - 0. We will show that 9' is
unique because ~(.) is strictly increasing over (Q, 9).
Notice that
(16) ~'(B) - 3F'(B) t F"(B)[9 - (cz - ci)].
Consider the set HI ~{B~~ G B G c2 - cl}. Then by the conditions of the
Proposition, 3l[B - (cz - cl)] G 3l[~ -(cz - cl)] s -F"(B)IF'(B) for all B E
H~. Thus F"(B)[B - (cz - cl)] ~-3F'(6) for all B E Ht which yields ~'(B) ~
OforaIlBEHI.
Now consider the set Hz ~{B~c2 - ct G B G g}. Then 3l[B - (c2 - cl)] ~
3l[9 - (c2 - cl)] ? -F"(B)IF'(9). Accordingly F"(B)[6 - (c2 - ct)] J
-3F'(B) tor all B E Hz, implying ~'(B) ~ 0 for all B E HZ.
As ~'(9) 7 0 for all 6 E HI U Hz, ~(n,(-) is strictly increasing over (~, 6). As a
result 8` - p z - p~ is unique. It then follows from (14) that also ( p~, p z) is
uniyuely determined. Q.E.D.
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To ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium, Ihe producen' cust clilTerences have to
be small relative to the size of thc support of F(-). In adJition, consumcr
preferences have to be sufiiciently dispersed. Again, the uniform distribulion is a
particular example satisfying the conditions of p(B). Proposition 3 is important for
extending the present analysis to a two-stage game in which thc duopolists first
simultaneously decide on the characteristics .r; of their product and then compele
by setting prices. Given uniqueness of the second-stage outcome, the firms'
first-stage payoffs are well-defined funetions of their choices xl and .r,. Indeed,
using Propositions I and 3 we can briefly outline the arguments to prove existence
of a subgame perfecl equilibrium in the two-stage game. To indicatc the depen-
dence of the preference distribution on ( x i, x, ), Iet !-( ~, x i, x. ) dcnotc the
dislribution function for a given choice of xl and x2. Similarly, firm i's unit cost
now becomes a function c(x;) of product characteristics. Assume that each firm i
chooses x; from some convex and compact set X; C!Rm with Xi fl X2 -~."'
Moreover let F(B, -) and c;(-) be continuous in (xl, x2). If then the conditions of
Propositions I and 3 are satisfied, a simple continuity argument establishes that the
equilibrium ( pi, p2) and the equilibrium payoffs fI i( pi. Pz) and II z( P i. P z) in
the second-stage subgame depend continuously on (xl , x2). Accordingly, we can
apply Theorem 3 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) which proves that the first-stage
game possesses a mixed sirategy equilibrium in which each firm i randomizes over
X;. Thus the overall game has a pure strategy equilibrium in the second stage and
a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first stage." This makes sense if one takes the
view that, in contrast with pricing decisions, production decisions exhibit some
degree of irreversibility so that mixed strategies in the first game stage are sensible.
In general one cannot conclude whether the conditions of Proposition I are more
restrictive than those of Proposition 3 or vice versa. lndeed, the parameter z in
Proposition 1 depends upon F(0) whereas the value of F(0) plays no role in
Proposition 3. For the case of symmetric markets, however, it is easily verified that
the existence result also implies uniqueness. Thus, as a Corollary to Propositions 1
and 3 we obtain12:
PttoPOStrtonl 4. Let - ll[9 - Q] s p(B) ~ II(9 - g) for all Q ~ B ~ 9. Then
ij {F(.), c 1, c2 } is a symmetric market, it has a unique equilihrinm ( pi, pz) and
Pi - Pi-
PttooF. By symmetry F(0) - I l2 and c 1- c2 . Therefore 2l( z- c 1)- 2l( z-
c2) - II[9 - ~]. Thus the conditions of Proposition I are satisfied and there is an
equilibrium. As 3I8 ~-ll[6 - ~] and ll[9 - ~] G 3ÍB, also the conditions of
Proposition 3 are satisfied. Thus there is a unique equilibrium (pi, pZ). In
'a The condition X~ rl X, -~ ensures that Assumption 1 is applicablc. If x~ - s,, then the Iwo
products arc no longer ditTerentiated and so F(., xt, ri) is degeneratc. To allow for Xi n Xz ~ p onc
can simply se[ Il i( p~, p 2) - flj(p i. p 2) - 0 for ri ~ xZ and use a continuity argument showing that
both firms' payofl's tend to zero when their products become identical.
" Interestingly, this contrasts with Osborne and Pitchik ( 19R71 who analyze Hotelling's (1929) model
with a miaed equilibrium in the price setting game and a pure equilibrium in the Iocation game.
'' The uniqueness of the equilibrium in thc symmctric duopoly has alco been noted by Perlofi and
Salop (19R5).
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addition, d' - p' - p i is the unique solution of ~i ( B) - 0, where ~(.) is defined
as in ( IS). Using F(U) - U2 and c, - cz it is easily checked that y(U) - U. This
proves B` - p;- p i - 0. E. U.Q-
5. EFFICIENCY
In this section we will analyze the equilibrium from the viewpoint of social
etFiciency. In the social optimum both brands should be produced only if ~ c cz -
c, ~ B. To see this, consider the case cz 7 c I. Brand 2 should then be supplied
only if there are consumers who are willing to bear the extra cost cz - cl for
substituting good I by good 2. This is the case if the set jB~ B ? cz - c I} has positive
measure or, equivalently, if B~ rz - ct. By an analogous argument, brand I
should bc madc availablc only if ~ c cz - c I. The following proposition shows that
the market outcome may involve positive profits for both firms even under
parameter constellations where producing both brands is socially inetficient.
PROPVStnoN 5. Let ~IF(U) c cz - c l c 9l[ I - F(U)]. Then f1, ( pi, p2) J 0
und 11 z( pi, P z)~ 0 in uny equilihrium ( Pi. Pi). ..
PROOF. First it will be shown that p i 1 c I. Suppose the contrary, i.e. p i- c I.
This implies pZ- c I t~. lndeed, one cannot have p z c c I t~ because F( Pz
- c,) - 0 for all Pz c cl t~ so that (lz(c,, cl t~) J Ilz(c,, Pz). Similarly,
one cannot have p Z ~ c I t~ because then F( pZ- p i) 1 U and I] ,( p, , p Z) 7
l l,(p i, p z) - 0 for all c, ~ p, ~ pi -~. Thus p i- c, implies pZ- c, t~.
Accordingly
(I~) nZ(n~.n~)-c., tQ-~,.
By settingpz - cl firm 2 could get Ilz(pi, c,) - Ilz(cl, c,) -[c, - cz][I -
F(U)]. But then [cz - c,]F(U) ~~ implies flz(pi, c,) J 17z(p~, pZ), a
contradiction. ~
Next it will be shown that p~ ~ c, implies I7 I( pi, pZ) J 0. Suppose the
contrary, i.e., Il ,( p;, p 2) - U. Then p i ~ c I implies F( pz - p~)- 0 so that
Pz -Pi ~ ~-Asllz(pi,Pi t~)~ nz(Pi,Pz)forallPz cPi f l3thisimplies
Pi - P i f B. But then one has 0- I1,(pi. ni) - nl(ni. P i t~) c n,(PI,
p i f (J) for all p I such that c I ~ p, ~ p;- p i -~, a contradiction. This proves
[I I ( p i, p Z) 1 U. An analogous argument shows that [cz - c I][ I- F(U)] c B
implics II,(p i, pZ) 1 0. Q.E.D.
Note that the interval (~IF(U), 9l[ I - F(U)]) contains the interval (~, 9) as a
subset because 0 c F(U) c 1. When the brand specification of the two firms is
fixed, the equilibrium may involve too much bul not too little product variety.
Using Proposition 5 we can easily construct an environment in which excessive
product difTerentiation also occurs when the firms are free to choose their products'
characteristics. Consider a two-stage game in which the firms first decide on the
variant of their product and then compete by setting prices. For simplicity, assume
that firm 2 can supply only one type of brand at the unit cost cz. Firm I, however,
has two options: lt can either produce some commodity u at the cost c i' or another
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commodity b at the cost ci . If firm I selects good a, then F(.) denotes the
cumulative distribution of the preference characteristic 6 E[~, 9); if it selects good
b, the corresponding distribution function is FQ(~), as defined by (10). Now assume
~IF(0) c cz - c i c~ and cZ - c~. Clearly, the eRciency criterion requires firm
I to produce good b rather than good a. Yet, it follows from Propositions 2 and 4
that choosing brand a yields higher profits for firm I in the price setting subgame
whenever a is close to zero. In this example, firm 1 will use product di(Terentiation
to relax price competition, a phenomenon that has been observed in spatial
compelition by D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) and in quality
competition by Shaked and Sutton (1982).
Even when operating both firms is socially optimal, the equilibrium allocation of
the two goods may turn out to be inefficient. According to the above etïiciency
argument, all consumers with characteristic B c cZ - ci should consume the first
brand while those with taste parameter 6 7 cZ - ct should buy the second brand.
In the market equilibrium, however, the buyers' decisions are determined by the
price difTerential pZ- pi. Consumer B purchases good 1 only if 6 ~ pi- p~;
otherwise he buys good 2. Consequently, the market allocation of the two brands
is efficient only ifp 2 - p i - c2 - c t. That is, the profit margins of both products
have to be identical. As the following Proposition shows, however, oligopolistic
competition will typically fail to satisfy this condition.
PROPOStrtoN 6. Ler ( p~, p Z) be an equilibrium sach rhat fl t( p i, p2) 7 0 and
RZ(Pi~ P2) ~ 0. Then p i - ci - P2 - c2.onlyijF(c2 - ct) - II2. IjF(cz -
ct) J ll2 then p i - ci 1 pZ - cZ, and ijF(ci - ct) c Il2 rhen pi - c~ G
Pz-c2.
PROOF. As [It(pi, p2) ~ 0 and []z(p~, pz) J 0, (p~, pZ) must satisfy the
first order conditions (14) and B` - p 2- p i must solve ~(6) - 0, where y(.)
is defined as in (IS). Thus 6' - c2 - ct and F'(9`) 1 O immediately implies
2F(e') - 2F(c2 - ct) - 1.
To prove the second statement suppose the contrary, i.e. F(cZ - c~ ) 1 Il2 and
9' Z c2 - ct. This implies 2F(B') J I. But 2F(9') ~ I and B` Z c2 - ct is
inconsistent with ~(6`) - 0, a contradiction. This proves that F(c2 - c t) J I l2
implies p Z- p i c cz - c t. An analogous argument shows that F(cZ - c t) c I l2
implies p2- P i~ c2 - c t. Q.E.D.
Consequently, too many consumers buy good 2 and firm 1's market share is
ineH'iciently low whenever F(cZ - c t) 1 112. IfF(c2 - c i) c 112, the inetficiency
is reversed. Proposition 6 also indicates that symmetric markets have a particular
efficiency property: The profit margins of both commodities are identical and create
no distortions in the consumers' purchasing decisions.
Ó. AN EXAMPLE
In this section we compute the equilibrium (p i, p 2) of a market with a uniform
distribution of the taste parameter 9. Moreover, as we will show in the following
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section, this example corresponds lo Hotelling's (1929) spatial duopoly in the case
of quadratic transportation costs.
Let FI H) -( H- QI ~I N- Q] for Q s H ~ H. Thcn the first ordcr condition for profit
maximization shows that firm I rcacts optimally to firm 2~s pricc p2 by setting p,
- c, if p, s c, t Q: n, - o.Sl n, - Q t c, J ir c i t Q~ nz ` c, - Q f 26;
and n, - p, - H if Pz ? c, - Q t 2B. Similarly, profit maximization by firm 2
implies sctting p, - cz if p, s c, - H; p, - o.ijn, t H f czJ if cz - B ~
p, s cz ~- B- 2Q; and pz - p, f Q if p, ? cz t B- 2Q.
Given these reaction functions, it follows that the equilibrium is unique.
Depending upon the cost difíerential cz - r, , there are three possible categories of
equilibrium: If cz - c, ? 2H - Q, then only firm I is active in equilibrium. The
equilibrium prices are p i - cz - B, p; - cz so that (1 I( Pi. P`) - cz - H- c,
and Ilz(p ~, pZ) - 0. If 2Q - 6 c c, - c, c 29 - Q, then both firms are active.
The equilibrium prices are given as
(18)
2 I 2 I
ni- 3[cl - Q] f 3 [c, f B], ni - 3[c, f B] t 3[ci - Q];
and the corresponding equilíbrium payoffs are
[cz - c, t B - 2Q]'-
(t9) f11(Pi, n'1 - 9[e - Q] ,
[c, - cz - Q t 2é]'`
nz(Pi. Pi) - 9[e - Q] .
Finally, only firm 2 is active if cz - c, ~ 2Q - 9. In this case pi - c, and p; -
c, f Q. Accordingly, II,(pi, pz) - 0 and []z(pi, pi) - cl t Q- cz.
7. APPLICATIONS
!n this section we will review Hotelling's (1929) model of duopolistic spatial
competition in the light of our findings. Our approach provides an easy understand-
ing of why this model fails to have a pure strategy equilibrium in the case of linear
transportation cost. Also, it demonstrates how changes in the transportation cost
function may restore existence of such an equilibrium. In addition, we show that
our framework can be used to explain nonexistence of pure strategy equilibrium in
Shilony's (1977) model of mixed pricing in oligopoly or Varian's (1980) model of
sales. ~
Hotelling's (1929) model can easily be translated into our description ofa market
by a tuple jF(.), cI, c2}. In his model the population of consumers is uniformly
distributed over the interval (0, I]. The two firms otTer products that are identical
in all respects except for the location of availability. The latter is determined by the
locations s, E[0, 1] and sz E(0, I] of firm 1 and 2, respectively, where x, c zz .
The consumer faces a transportation cost that is a function t(-) of (Euclidian)
distance. For the consumer who is located at a E(0, I] the overall cost of
purchasing brand i is then p; f t(~x; - rr~). Consequently, this consumer will visit
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firm I only if r(~xi - u~) - r(~.rz - u~) ~ p~ - pt. Thercfure, it fulluws from (I)
lhat thi; consumcr's prrf~rence paramelcr B„ is given as
(?U) B„ - r(~xi - u~) - r(~-i, - u~).
As u is unifurmly distributed over (U, I J, (2U1 alluws us to compute the cumulative
distributiun function F(.) of the parameter B.
Hotelling (1929) tuok I(.) to be linear su that r(~x; - u~) - k~x; - u~ with k ~
U. It then folluws from (20) that all cunsumers located in the interval [U, xt J have
the same preference characteristic B- k( x t - xZ ). If u lies in the interval ( x i, xZ ),
then the associated taste parameter is B- k(2u - xt - x2). Finally, all consumers
in the interval [ xz , I J have the same characteristic B- k(xZ - x t). !n summary,
the assumptiun of linear transportatiun costs generates a preference distribution
with support ()~, 9J -[k( x t - xZ ), k( xZ - x t 1J and a cumulative distribution
function
o, if e ~ ~,
(2I) F(B) - U.Slxi t x~ t Blk), if Q ~ B ~{~,
I, if B ? B.
Clearly, this distribution violates uur Assumption I because there are mass points
at the lower and upper end of the support (B, 9J whenever x i ~ 0 and xz ~ 1. These
mass points generate discuntinuities in demand. Even more importantly, they
preclude approximating F(~) by a sequence of continuous distributions that satisfy
the conditions of Propositiun I. As a result, with linear transportation costs the
duopolists' payofTs may fail to be quasi-concave so that an equilibrium may not
exist. In fact, D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse ( 1979) pointed out that this
nonexistence problem becomes relevant when the distance x2 - x t between the
two stores is relativcly small.
D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) also showed that a quadratic cost
functiun ~(~x; - u~) - k(x; - u)- results in the existence of equilibrium for any
given locations (x t, x, ) of the two firms. To see how this change in transporiation
costs alters the distributiun function F(-), note that in the quadratic case a9laa -
2k(x, - xi) ~ 0 and so ~- k(xi - x;] and B - k[(I - xt)'' -(1 - x,)2].
Moreover, as B is a linear function of u, it follows frum the uniform distribution of
u ovcr ((1, IJ that B i, unifurmly distributed over [(1, HJ. Cunseyucnlly, lhe prices
( Pi. Pz) and profits I l i( p i, p~ ) and 11,( p i. p;) of our above example describe
the equilibrium of Hotelling's mudel when transportation costs are quadratic. In
particular if c i- c,, both firms are active and our equations ( I8) and (19) coincide
with the equilibrium computed by D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979).
Interestingly, our existence result goes beyond the case of quadratic transpor-
tation costs: Consider a sequcnce of cost functions {r„(d)}„-t such that lim„yx
r„(d) - cl' for all 0~ d s I. A simple cuntinuity argument then establishes that
Theorem I hulds for n large enuugh. That is, existence of equilibrium is guaranteed
as long as transpurtation custs are not tou far frum being quadratic.
Our appruach reveals that mass puints in the preference distribution are
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responsiblc for thc noncxistcnce of purc Nash cquilibria not only in thc original
Hotelling modcl but also in thc oligopolislic pricing modcl of Shiluny (1977) or in
Varian's (19R0) mudcl of salcs. In Varian's modcl thcre arc infurmcd and unin-
formed consumers. The former buy thc good at thc store with thc lowcst price,
whcreas the lattcr randomly dccide whether to shop a[ store 1 or store 2. Clcarly,
with these assumptiuns the preference distribution must violate our cuntinuity
assumption which explains why thcre is unly a mixed equilibrium in Varian's
mudcl. Similarly, Shilony considers a market where consumers can purchase
costlessly from a neighborhood store, but incur some cost s if they venture a more
distanl storc. !n our tcrminology this mcans that all consumcrs in Ihc ncighhorhood
of firm I have the characterislic N-~i --s as thcy stay with firm I whenever
-s ~ p~ - n i. Similarly, consumers in the neighborhood of firm 2 are willing to
visit firm I only if s s nz - nl and so they have the characteristic B- 6- s. As
Shilony demonstrates, his model fails to have a pure price equilibtium. In our
framework this is easily understood as it generates a distribution function charac-
terized by F( B) - 0.5 fur ~ s 9 ~ 9 with two point masses of 0.5 at ~ and B. Our
analysis also indicates that a dispersion of the cust s can restore existence of a pure
price setting equilibrium. Assume for example that s is uniformly distributed on [0,
s] across the population of consumers. Then this is easily seen to imply a uniform
distribution of 9 on [g, 6J with ~--s and B- s. We may thus cunclude that this
modification implies existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
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